CSPAN/NEWSMAKERS

Host: Greta Brawner

Guest: Secretary Steven Chu

Reporters: Chris Holly, Josef Herbet

GRETA BRAWNER, HOST: This week's "Newsmakers" is Steven Chu, Energy Secretary for the Obama administration. And here to help with the questioning is Chris Holly of Energy Daily and Josef Herbert of the Associated Press.

Joe has the first question.

JOSEF HERBET, REPORTER, ASSOCIATED PRESS: Secretary Chu, this week, the White House announced that President Obama is going to Copenhagen to try to give a jump-start to these negotiations. Given that Congress has yet to act on climate change and there's bitter partisan division, what kind of a specific commitment do you think the president can actually make in terms of greenhouse gas reductions?

STEVEN CHU, ENERGY SECETRARY FOR OBAMA ADMINISTRATION: Well, I think the intent of the president's visit to Copenhagen and followed up by a lot of cabinet presence in Copenhagen is, first, to show the United States is very serious about the energy and climate issue, number one.

Number two, Copenhagen, as – as Prime Minister Rasmussen has said, is now, since Congress, for example, won't be able to address the energy and climate bill until after Copenhagen, that it's a framework for all countries – I mean, he – let me back up and say Prime Minister Rasmussen said – proposed that – going forward, what can you expect in Copenhagen? Do you expect going in (INAUDIBLE) framework that will say, "This is our goal. This is going to be towards a legally binding treaty." We may not – we're not going to get there in Copenhagen, but this is the steps we need to take in order to get there.

So the good news is, there's a lot of motion going on. And I, quite frankly, am encouraged that a lot of countries are – are beginning to say – considering the way we were five years ago and beyond, things have been very positive.

CHRIS HOLLY, REPORTER, ENERGY DAILY: Mr. Secretary, the White House on Wednesday also announced that it will offer a 2020 emissions cut proposal, 17 percent below 2005 levels and described this proposal as a provisional proposal, essentially, contingent on Congress enacting this legislation. What happens if the Congress doesn't enact legislation?

CHU: Well, I'm not sure I remember whether they said a specific number. I think they said that they were expecting to propose a – it probably – my guess would be a range, but I'm not sure if – I don't recall seeing a specific number being discussed in the White House.

HOLLY: But if there is no legislation, are the administrative actions, such as the EPA rulemakings, that CAFE proposal, and other actions, such as the efficiency investments in the stimulus bill, are they sufficient, do you think, to reassure our foreign partners that the U.S. is, indeed, taking firm action?

CHU: Well, all the things you mentioned are things that we are doing. But in addition to that, we also need to send – we want a comprehensive energy bill. And the president has made it quite clear, a comprehensive energy bill also includes a cap on carbon and both shorter-term and long-term goals. So – so we are still pushing for those goals.

The exact number, I think, is, you know, up for grabs now, and we see a range that the House has said (INAUDIBLE) the – the bill that came out of – the Kerry-Boxer was 20 percent. It's going to be some range of, you know, of – of something. That's a very important part of it, in my mind, because that sends a long-term signal.

All the things we're doing on the Recovery Act money to promote clean energy, all the things we're doing on the CAFE standards, all those things are part of the complete package, all the things we're doing in energy efficiency and retrofitting.

But you also need to send a long-term signal that says to a company, if you're thinking of investing in a power plant, it's a 60-plus-year investment. It could be $1 billion to $10 billion. That signal of what's going to be happening not only 5 years and 10 years from – but what's going to be happening in 20, 30, 40 years will influence deeply those decisions. And so it's that long-term signal that's also very important.

Having said that, we're – the administration, president has made it quite clear that we have to be sensitive to certain sections of the United States. You have to give time for judgment. You can't move to an energy-efficient – highly energy-efficient, green economy overnight. It takes time. And so – so – but that long-term signal is very important.

And, quite frankly, there's a lot of capital right now standing on the sidelines wanting to know, what's the signal? What is it going to be? And I think once we – Congress says, "OK, this is going to be it," and working with the president, I think a lot of – I think a lot of investments will be made.

HERBET: Mr. Secretary, you – you visited India recently, and you visited China recently. One of the big criticisms that is heard in Congress among Republicans is that we can't solve the climate issue alone, that we have to have commitments from these countries. What's your sense of – of where China is going, for example, or India is going in terms of actual reductions in greenhouse gases, carbon dioxide, from burning fossil fuels?

CHU: Well, I will agree with the sentiment that this is – if you look at what, for example, the United States and China, we're over 40 percent of the greenhouse gas emissions in the world today. So we need both the developed countries and the developing countries to say, "We're all in this together."

Of course, nobody expects a developing country to – to decrease their carbon emissions or do things that a developed country has the capability of doing. And so the language in the U.N., which is commonly differences is something the United States subscribes to.

Now, if I look at what China is doing, I see – I've seen a sea change over the last year or two. I recall there was a release of a report that I had the privilege of co-chairing on how does the world transition to sustainable energy that was sponsored by the InterAcademy Council, which represents science academies around the world. And I had the pleasure of talking to the premier of China, Wen Jiabao, about this about two-and-a-half years ago. They were pushing energy efficiency, but there was no direct mention of climate change. We were talking about these issues.

Two years later, I go back, have another senate conversation with the premier and the vice premier, and I'm hearing something different, that climate change, if we continue business as usual, would be devastating to China and the rest of the world. I said, not – not only are we going to be pushing energy efficiency, we have to diversify our energy supply. We're too dependent on coal. The carbon emission growth in China is unsustainable.

And so they have moved very aggressively – they're pushing hard to get 15 percent of their energy renewable, a push hard to close down their least efficient coal plants, and are now constructing the most efficient ones. They're pushing hard on energy efficiency.

If you look at the things China is doing in the last year, it's incredibly impressive. Why are they doing this? Well, there's two reasons: Climate change is going to be bad for China and the rest of the world, but perhaps even number one, not number two, this they see as an economic opportunity for China.

China, if you – there's an official tally of what's called high technology manufacturing. It includes aerospace, pharmaceuticals, test equipment, electronics, things that you generally regard as high technology manufacturing. China has passed Europe and the United States in leading in high technology manufacturing in the last couple of years. They see a transition to a green energy economy, of developing a solar, a wind, a high-voltage transmission system as something where they want to be the world leader. So they're pushing because they see incredible economic opportunity.

Now, this is where China's going. This is where a lot of European countries have gone in the past. China's being very aggressive about it, incredible. They are now leading the world in high-voltage electricity transmission over longer distances.

HERBET: So do you – do you sense that China will commit to some sort of carbon reductions in Copenhagen?

CHU: Well, I – I don't know, but – but I – I would hope yes. If you look at what they're doing internally, when they say they have a target, right now, their – their current five-year plan is to increase better their energy intensity, so as their GDP grows, their – their use of energy per growth of GDP will be increasing by 20 percent.

For that – that's this five-year plan. Another five-year plan, again, a very aggressive schedule, but now they're talking for the following five-year plan of saying it will be a carbon emission to GDP.

Now, why is that significant? Because they're pushing very heavily on hydro, renewable, like wind and solar, and nuclear. And so if you just take what they're already saying about where they want to go on – on non-carbon-emitting sources of energy, plus energy efficiency, you're looking perhaps at 24 percent – it was the estimate I've seen – decrease in the amount of carbon emissions per GDP.

And there is a committee that recommended somewhere between 4 percent and 5 percent to the government. Five percent is a very important number, because if that compounds annually, that means a 27 percent decrease in carbon dioxide per GDP. Now, why is that important? Because eventually in the next couple of decades, China's growth is going to start to level off. They will be easing into a developed economy. A lot of their infrastructure will be maturing.

And you don't expect China's growth to be growing at 8 percent, you know, forever. It's going to have to taper off. It's going to have to go to sort of a developed country and growth of 3 percent or 4 percent. Once you get that, then you've just – and you still have this carbon dioxide to GDP thing, that means they – they just put themselves on a trajectory that says it's going to cap and decline.

So this is – so – but these are the issues that they're now thinking very hard about. But I see my major role is to say, how can the Department of Energy, number one, help the United States become economically competitive in this future clean energy economy? And number two, if we can get partnerships with China, with India that would be mutually beneficial to both of us, it'll help each other.

So it's – instead of worrying about numbers and things, we have to get moving. We definitely – now, the numbers are important, but we certainly have to get moving.

And it's just like the – the CAFE standards. You know, that's getting moving. And, you know, we don't want it to stop at 35-and-a-half miles to a gallon. You know, we want to continue those things.

HOLLY: Mr. Secretary, what number for a carbon intensity target from China would impress you, if – we might expect China to make such an announcement any day now, but what number would impress you?

CHU: Well, I would – a number that would impress me, I would have to go back and look at the details. But if I took their already stated energy intensity target and their already stated goals and where they want to be, in terms of renewable energy, in terms of nuclear, hydro, wind, solar, all those things, anything that wrapped all those things up together and said, "We'll be at least there," anything north of that or at that point, so it's a unified – here's where we're going to be, because these are pretty aggressive goals, would be – would be quite a commitment.

HERBET: The administration, I know, is somewhat concerned that – not to repeat what they call the – the mistake of Kyoto, of course, the climate talks in '97 that produced commitments to reduce emissions among developing – developed countries. The United States never signed that and never ratified that. And the Bush administration basically walked away from it.

Can you give some assurance that whatever commitment or promise or goal that the president makes at Copenhagen won't also – never be ratified, never be approved by Congress? Because congressional debate about climate change is extremely intense at this time. And there's no indication that you will have the 60 votes in the Senate that would be required to pass climate legislation. How concerned are you about that?

CHU: Well, going back to it – looking at what, for example, Prime Minister Rasmussen is now saying, realistically, what can we expect out of Copenhagen, a framework of – a path forward? You're jumping kind of to – I wouldn't even say it's an end point. I would say it's the end of the beginning point, which is the beginning of the treaty of verification, you know, and all these other things.

But in the end, I think right now, what the prime minister is saying is we're not going to expect by the time of Copenhagen to have a treaty that we then – the countries go back to their respective, you know, legislatures and say, "OK, this is – this is what we need ratified," but a path forward so that with the – the beginning of the end is that– now, I stress the beginning, so the end of the beginning, because in the end, if you look at the experience of Kyoto, where there was treaty terms that were hammered out, several countries did meet their commitments. Others, which did ratify it, did not meet their commitments. Some met their commitments because of unforeseen financial issues.

And so in the end, not only – you know, a treaty is a beginning, and then you've got to follow through. And so I think you have to look at all these things. And so what we're now saying is what the prime minister was saying in the APEC conference and what, I think, the world's beginning to realize is, we've got to get going. We've got to get going as aggressively as you can. These – a treaty is an important point in this, but to me, it's – it's certainly – it's a beginning. Now then you have to execute on that. And every country has to then say, "We – we – we've got to start decreasing our unsustainable growth in carbon emissions."

And in the United States, they're – because we are a developed country, because we have incredible technical capability, I think we can show leadership, and a leadership that will help us in our economic prosperity.

HOLLY: Mr. Secretary, if I could change gears just slightly, both the president and you on a number of occasions have said that nuclear power has to be part of the solution to climate change.

CHU: Right.

HOLLY: But also, the administration has made it very clear that the Yucca Mountain nuclear waste repository is a dead letter. You have nuclear waste from power generation piling up at the nation's 110-plus nuclear stations. You also have huge amounts of high-level waste at Hanford and the other nuclear weapons sites.

CHU: (INAUDIBLE)

HOLLY: You also have contractual agreements to take this waste, both at the nuclear plant waste and the level – high-level waste. How are you going to avoid exposing U.S. taxpayers to lawsuits from power companies, from the states where these waste sites are located, who have a legitimate legal argument that the U.S. is not living up to its obligations?

CHU: Well, first, let's talk about this feeling about (ph) waste. The NRC has said that dry cask storage at current sites is going to be safe. It's not safe for the next year, but for an extended period of time, 50 years maybe beyond that. And so the – one could say, all right, if we guarantee that, you know, this material, the dry cask storage at these sites – you might think of shrinking a little bit in the number of sites, but if it's going to be safe environmentally, and then we also want it to be safe for security reasons, nonproliferation reasons, that gives us some time to make – to re-examine thoughtfully how to go forward in a – in a comprehensive way to deal with the waste problem of low-level to high-level waste problem.

Now, a lot has happened since the nuclear waste act, since Yucca Mountain was picked, both on the technical level, both on Supreme Court rulings, a lot of things. And so this is the major reason why we're asking a blue-ribbon panel to be – it's the last stages. Hopefully, it soon will be announced to come – step back and say, "Take a look. Take a look at, number one, what do you see coming on the horizon in the next 50 years, in terms of nuclear technology? As an example, we have a policy in the United States that started with Jimmy Carter that you take the fuel, you use it once through cycling, and after that, it's no longer being recycled."

The trouble with that is that it means you are extracting less than 1 percent of the energy content of the remaining of the uranium we dug out the ground and refined, OK? Which means, also, you're making a lot of waste, OK? And there's a lot of depleted uranium. Some technologies are coming forward where there – it's – it's highly conceivable that we can have in a very cost-effective way where you can start taking even the depleted uranium and bringing it – extracting much more of the energy content, also, that we could, using fast spectrum neutrons, a number of other things to reduce, to extract more of the energy, and to reduce the amount of waste, not by a factor of two, but maybe a factor of five or ten, OK, and to reduce the lifetime, all good things.

That means what we consider as waste, we should be considering as pre-owned, pre-used, and could be recycled. It also would require different categorizations, because that would mean you wouldn't want storage that then you could cycle back, but eventually, after you've extracted most of the economic content, the energy content of this fuel, then you don't ever want to have access to it again. That becomes a different requirement on the waste repository, one that would be temporary, a couple hundred years, and another would be set (ph) forever, which actually would then open up, you know, a different, better geological sites.

So we want this blue-ribbon panel to just step back and say, "Make some reasonable assumptions of what we know today that we didn't know 25 years ago." And – and then look at different types of geological sites for what you might think, not – not to pick a site, but just different classes, whether they're the type in Yucca Mountain, whether they're the type of salt-type flats, or clay-like depositories.

So – so this is a way that you can actually go forward in a much more scientific, rational way. You know, the – the one-size-fits-all site that was chosen years ago is, quite frankly, not the ideal site because, for the very longest-term storage, it's – it's – it's – you know, we don't really know now if over a million years what happens.

HERBET: Mr. Secretary, no state wants a nuclear waste site in their state. Do you envision at some point someone has to decide, even though you – you were talking about reprocessing...

CHU: Right.

HERBET: ... and that in itself is somewhat controversial, because one of the things produced in reprocessing is plutonium, and there are nonproliferation risks.

CHU: Right.

HERBET: So – so let me ask you this. Do you feel that reprocessing can develop where it is not a nonproliferation risk with plutonium? And, secondly, what is – how do you envision the political battles down the road when somebody's going to have to take whatever waste is left over?

CHU: OK, so, regarding to your first comment that no state wants any radioactive waste, well, I mean, the folks – we have a low-level radioactive waste repository in New Mexico called Witt. The local areas around there are very, very happy with this. They were afraid of the transport and things like that, but it's been exquisitely safety. It's essentially a mining operation where you dig into a salt mine, you put the stuff in there. They're very happy with it. It's actually income-generating. The environmental concerns of the needs (ph) it's been so carefully, so responsibly that everyone around there is very happy. It's income-producing.

So I wouldn't even – it's not an automatic that no state will take this, OK, if you show you can do this in completely responsible, environmentally safe, protective way, it's not a given that certain states might not want to.

In regard to the proliferation issue, I think you hit a very important part – point. The – the countries that are now reprocessing used – a modified version of a process the United States invented in the '50s called a purex process, it takes out of the spent fuel and makes – it creates a stream of plutonium and plutonium oxide. Once you create a stream of plutonium, OK, if gotten in the wrong hands, could make an atomic bomb, OK?

And so what you need to do to make it proliferation resistant is to say that, just by hijacking some of this reprocessed material, you can't now have the parts that – so you want to, let's say, there's one possibility. You want to dope it with things that are heavy neutron emitters so that before you can actually get an ignition, it just kind of fizzles, you actually want to dedope it with very hot radioactive things so that, unless you had very sophisticated glove – remote glove box arrangements, you'll be killed, OK. So we call that self-protecting.

And a number of other ideas so that just the hijacking of the shipment of the fuel from one place to another doesn't open you up to this. This is – this is an important part. And so the Department of Energy wants to develop proliferation-resistant methods before we go into reprocessing.

BRAWNER: Mr. Secretary, I think we have time for one last question.

HOLLY: Mr. Secretary, a year ago, you were plucked from a prestigious business and academic career and plunged into the political morass that is Washington. What has surprised you the most? Or what – what lesson has been the most valuable for you in terms of negotiating the politics that perhaps weren't so evident in your former life?

I mean, for example, as a scientist, when you contemplate the climate change issue, it has to be frustrating to hear the – the political arguments against taking action.

CHU: Well, it depends. For example, I think, first, the reason I'm doing this is because I care so deeply about it, number one, and, number two, that the United States can lead the way to a solution to the energy and climate problem and that a solution is possible, OK, and that if – whatever I can do to get us towards those solutions that would be worth anything.

Now, the good news is – I think – I've been told by members of Congress from both sides of the aisle – that they don't treat me like the normal person who's in the cabinet. I try to answer questions. I come in and we – we try to talk about, what do we know? What does science tell us about this? What does – what do we know about what might be possible? What – and – and I hope I come across not trying to sell a bill of goods, overselling (ph), but this is – this is – this is possible, this is hard, this is unlikely. This is unlikely to occur 5 or 10 years from now. This is – we have a good shot at it.

And also to open up things where, because of my connections in the research community and because I'm a techie, I like to know what's going on and what's on the minds in the most innovative companies and in most innovative laboratories and universities and national labs, that I can give them a glimpse of what might be possible, but I say, "This might be a long shot. This is not."

This is good, because it makes it seem like we don't – you know, sometimes they say, "Oh, we can't do this. It's impossible. It would require a miracle." And I said, "Well, no, not really. But you – but it's going to be hard, but it's possible."

And so what I like about this is, is – now, there are certain people who have just decided they're – they're not going to come around, and so that's like – and I'm not so wildly optimistic that I think I can convince everybody, but a large, actually, bipartisan group are willing to listen and willing to actually – and, you know, they can – they can sit their staff and go back and research what I said, and that's great.

And so as we continue to do this, then they can build, you know, and say, "OK, here's someone who actually knows something technically about some of these issues and can open their eyes to saying this is possible."

But I go back to the final thing. It's not only possible. First, we have to do it, because of the climate issue, but it's incredible opportunity. The – this is our lead to lose. Why should we cede high-tech manufacturing anywhere in the world? Why – this – this – this transition to a clean energy, which is essentially a new second industrial revolution, where the first industrial revolution gave us all the energy we want in order to create unimaginable wealth, now we decided – we learned that we – we – we can't do this without some sense of sustainability, which includes carbon emission, so it's a little harder.

Now we've got to get the energy we've gotten used to, but in a much cleaner way, OK? That's going to require a rebuilding of existing infrastructure, a creation of new infrastructure. It requires incredible intellectual ingenuity and invention. It's going to create a lot of jobs for a long time, because it means that you actually have to transition entire infrastructures and economies.

This is great. This is job creation, and it's a high-technology issue, so the American innovation and R&D system is still the best in the world. So why shouldn't we take the lead?

BRAWNER: Mr. Secretary, we'll have to leave it there. Thank you for being on C-SPAN's "Newsmakers."

CHU: All right. Thank you.

BRAWNER: We appreciate your time.

CHU: All right. Great.

BRAWNER: Chris Holly of Energy Daily and Josef Herbert of the Associated Press, Chris, we just talked to the secretary, talked about Copenhagen and the effort they're going to put forth there, the Obama administration. What did you hear?

HOLLY: Well, I think they are – have decided to – to do a real full-court press in Copenhagen. They're sending five cabinet members, including Secretary Chu, and two senior White House officials over there to make the case that, even without the legislation having been enacted yet, the United States is acting aggressively to reduce emissions across a broad set of fronts.

BRAWNER: What would Secretary Chu's role be at Copenhagen?

HOLLY: Well, he's been identified as selling the message on energy efficiency and renewable energy initiatives that the United States has taken. There's a lot – there's $80 billion in the economic stimulus law devoted specifically to efficiency in renewables. He's going to make the case to European, African, Asian delegates that, even in the absence of legislation, this spending will reduce U.S. emissions.

BRAWNER: And, Joe Herbert, you asked about India and China. What did you hear in his answer?

HERBET: Well, two things. One is that I think the administration hopes that if they can get India and China to commit to something, and if they can show significant progress on that front in Copenhagen, it'll come back in the spring and help them pass a bill in Congress.

One of the biggest criticisms that there is and one that sort of resonates is, why should we do something that's going to hurt us economically when China and India, which are going to produce huge amounts of carbon dioxide, are not doing anything?

So I think – and he seems to – the other thing that came out is, I think the administration, correctly or not, seems to think that it can get China to do things. In the same respect, I think it's – he also has made clear that the administration is ready to do a little deal-making in Congress, maybe put a little more nuclear into – into a bill, but – but seems to be confident that it can get a bill, even though, right now, they're way short of getting the 60 votes in the Senate, and there are centrist Democrats – as long as – as well as Republicans – almost all Republicans – who are very opposed to this bill, saying it's an energy tax, or in terms of Democrats, saying it could hurt places like Ohio and – and push jobs overseas, perhaps to China. So I think that seems to be where they think Copenhagen can help them on the Hill.

BRAWNER: Joe Herbert of the Associated Press and Chris Holly of Energy Daily, thank you both for your time.

HOLLY: Thank you.

END